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Abstract—In this paper, we first introduce the notion of
channel leakage as the minimum mutual information between
the channel input and channel output. As its name indicates,
channel leakage quantifies the (least) information leakage to the
malicious receiver. In a broad sense, it can be viewed as a dual
concept of channel capacity, which characterizes the (maximum)
information transmission to the targeted receiver. We obtain
explicit formulas of channel leakage for the white Gaussian case
and colored Gaussian case. We also study the implications of
channel leakage in characterizing the fundamental limitations of
privacy leakage for streaming data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of privacy for streaming data or dynamic data
(see, e.g., [1]–[7] and the references therein) is attracting more
and more attention in recent years. One important character-
istic of streaming data or dynamic data is that information
is not only contained in the samples at each time instant
but also in the correlation over time [8]. On the other hand,
information-theoretic privacy (see, e.g., [1]–[3], [7], [9]–[16]
and the references therein) features a fundamental privacy
concept, and the most commonly used information-theoretic
measure of privacy leakage is mutual information (see, e.g.,
[1]–[3], [7], [9]–[16] and the references therein). What we
are discussing in this paper will be in the general scope of
information-theoretic privacy for streaming data (see, e.g., [1],
[2], [7] and the references therein).
Particularly, in this paper we first formally introduce the
concept of channel leakage, which is defined as the minimum
mutual information between the channel input and channel
output of a dynamic channel, supposing that the density
function of the channel input is given while that of the
channel noise can be designed, oftentimes subject to certain
power constraints. For a given information source (as channel
input) while subject to constraints on the information mask
(as channel noise), channel leakage characterizes the least
possible information leakage to a malicious receiver who has
access to the masked version of the information source, i.e., the
information source added with information mask (as channel
output). We examine particularly the white Gaussian case
and the colored Gaussian case, obtaining analytical formulas
for the channel leakage as well as the power spectrum of
the noise, indicating explicitly how to design the optimal
information mask. It is also worth mentioning that, when
designing the optimal information mask, channel leakage leads
to “fire-extinguishing” power allocation policies, which are
fundamentally different from the “water-filling” policy for
channel capacity as well as the “reverse water-filling” policy
for rate distortion.
Naturally, this notion of channel leakage may be employed
to characterize the fundamental limits of privacy leakage of
streaming data. Specifically, consider the scenario in which a
privacy mask is to be added to a given data stream, resulting in
a masked data stream that an eavesdropper may have access to.
The information-theoretic privacy leakage (on average) would
then be defined as the mutual information rate between the
original data stream (as a stochastic process) and the masked
data stream (as another stochastic process), that is, how much
information can be extracted from the latter about the former
on average. Accordingly, we may ask two questions. The first
question is: Given a certain power constraint (on the privacy
mask or on the masked data stream), what would be the least
possible average privacy leakage in the long run, and how
to design the privacy mask to achieve this lower bound? Or
equivalently (in a dual manner): Given a certain requirement
on the privacy level in terms of average privacy leakage, what
would be the least possible average power needed on the
privacy mask or on the masked data, and how to design the
privacy mask to achieve this bound? It turns out the channel
leakage and the “fire-extinguishing” power allocation provide
mathematically explicit and physically intuitive solutions to all
these problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the technical preliminaries. In Section III, we intro-
duce the notion of channel leakage and discuss its properties.
Section IV presents the fundamental limits of privacy leakage
for streaming data based upon Section III. Conclusions are
given in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the paper, we consider real-valued continuous
random variables and random vectors, as well as discrete-time
stochastic processes. All random variables, random vectors,
and stochastic processes will be assumed to be zero-mean.
We represent random variables and random vectors using bold-
face letters. Given a stochastic process {xk}, we denote the
sequence x0, . . . ,xk by x0,...,k for simplicity. The logarithm
is with base 2. A stochastic process {xk} ,xk ∈ R is said to
be stationary if Rx (i, k) = E [xixi+k] depends only on k,
and can thus be denoted as Rx (k) for simplicity. The power
spectrum of a stationary process {xk} ,xk ∈ R is defined as
Sx (ω) =
∞∑
k=−∞
Rx (k) e
−jωk.
Moreover, the variance of {xk} is given by
σ2
x
= lim
k→∞
E
[
x
2
k
]
= Rx (0) =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Sx (ω) dω.
Entropy and mutual information are the most basic notions
in information theory [8], which we introduce below.
Definition 1: The differential entropy of a random vector
x ∈ Rm with density px (x) is defined as
h (x) = −
∫
px (x) log px (x) dx.
The conditional differential entropy of random vector x ∈ Rm
given random vector y ∈ Rn with joint density px,y (x, y) and
conditional density px|y (x, y) is defined as
h (x|y) = −
∫
px,y (x, y) log px|y (x, y) dxdy.
The mutual information between random vectors x ∈ Rm,y ∈
R
n with densities px (x), py (y) and joint density px,y (x, y)
is defined as
I (x;y) =
∫
px,y (x, y) log
px,y (x, y)
px (x) py (y)
dxdy.
The entropy rate of a stochastic process {xk} ,xk ∈ R
m is
defined as
h∞ (x) = lim sup
k→∞
h (x0,...,k)
k + 1
.
The mutual information rate between two stochastic processes
{xk} ,xk ∈ R
m and {yk} ,yk ∈ R
n is defined as
I∞ (x;y) = lim sup
k→∞
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
.
Properties of these notions can be found in, e.g., [8], [17]–
[19].
III. CHANNEL LEAKAGE
Note that channel leakage can be defined for classes of
communication channels broader than additive noise channels.
In this paper, however, we focus on additive channels for
simplicity.
Definition 2: Consider an additive noise channel
yk = xk + zk, (1)
where {xk} ,xk ∈ R
m denotes the channel input, {yk} ,yk ∈
R
m denotes the channel output, and {zk} , zk ∈ R
m denotes
the additive noise. The channel leakage L of such a commu-
nication channel is defined as
L = inf
pz
I∞ (x;y) = inf
pz
lim sup
k→∞
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
, (2)
where the infimum is taken over all possible densities pz of
the noise process allowed for the channel.
As its name indicates, channel leakage quantifies the (least)
information leakage to a malicious receiver. To compare with,
let us review the definition of channel capacity [8], which
characterizes the (maximum) information transmission to a
targeted receiver.
Definition 3: The channel capacity C of the communication
channel given in (1) is defined as
C = sup
px
I∞ (x;y) = sup
px
lim sup
k→∞
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
, (3)
where the supremum is taken over all possible densities px of
the input process allowed for the channel.
In a broad sense, channel leakage may be viewed as a
dual notion of channel capacity. Particularly, channel leakage
is defined as the minimum mutual information rate between
the channel input and channel output, with the channel input
given; meanwhile, channel capacity is defined as the maximum
mutual information rate between the channel input and channel
output, with the channel noise given. On the other hand, the
following relationship between channel leakage and channel
capacity may be established in general.
Proposition 1: Denote the channel leakage with (given)
input density px and noise power constraint E
[
z
2
k
]
≤ N as
L (px, N) = inf
E[z2k]≤N
I∞ (x;y) , (4)
and denote the channel capacity with (given) noise density pz
and input power constraint E
[
x
2
k
]
≤ P as
C (P, pz) = sup
E[x2k]≤P
I∞ (x;y) . (5)
If
σ2
x
=
∫ ∞
−∞
x2px (x) dx = P, (6)
and
σ2
z
=
∫ ∞
−∞
z2px (z) dz = N, (7)
then
L (px, N) ≤ C (P, pz) . (8)
Proof: Since
σ2
x
=
∫ ∞
−∞
x2px (x) dx = P,
we have σ2
x
≤ P ; similarly, since
σ2
z
=
∫ ∞
−∞
z2px (z) dz = N,
we have σ2
z
≤ N . As a result,
L (px, N) = inf
E[z2k]≤N
I∞ (x;y) ≤ I∞ (x;y) |px,pz
≤ sup
E[x2k]≤P
I∞ (x;y) = C (P, pz) ,
which concludes the proof.
Let us now consider some special classes of communication
channels. We shall start with the white Gaussian case.
Theorem 1: Consider a scalar channel ofm = 1 and suppose
that the channel input {xk} is stationary white Gaussian with
variance σ2
x
= E
[
x
2
k
]
. Suppose also that {zk} is indepen-
dent of {xk}. Then, the channel leakage with noise power
constraint E
[
z
2
k
]
≤ N is given by
L =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2
x
N
)
. (9)
Proof: See Appendix A.
It is known [8] that the channel capacity of a scalar AWGN
channel, where the channel noise {zk} is stationary white
Gaussian with variance σ2
z
= E
[
z
2
k
]
and the input power
constraint is E
[
x
2
k
]
≤ P , is given by
C =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2
z
)
.
Note that the distribution of a zero-mean stationary white
Gaussian process is fully determined by its variance (second
moment) [20]. As such, if σ2
x
= P and σ2
z
= N , then it holds
for this pair that
L (px, N) = L
(
σ2
x
, N
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N
)
= C
(
P, σ2
z
)
= C (P, pz) . (10)
Let us next consider the colored Gaussian case and present
the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Consider a scalar channel of m = 1 and
suppose that the channel input {xk} is stationary colored
Gaussian with power spectrum Sx (ω). Suppose also that {zk}
is independent of {xk}. Then, the channel leakage with noise
power constraint E
[
z
2
k
]
≤ N is given by
L =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
Sx (ω)
N (ω)
dω, (11)
where
N (ω) =
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
] , (12)
and ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
N (ω) dω =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
]dω = N.
(13)
Proof: See Appendix B.
The power allocation policy in (12) may be viewed as a
“fire-extinguishing” policy, referring to a policy that delivers
more power to noisier channels, which is opposite to the
“water-filling” policy for channel capacity [8].
To compare with, the channel capacity of a scalar ACGN
channel, where the channel noise {zk} is stationary colored
Gaussian with power spectrum Sz (ω) and the input power
constraint is E
[
x
2
k
]
≤ P , is given by [8]
C =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
P (ω)
Sz (ω)
dω,
where
P (ω) = max {0, ζ − Sz (ω)} , (14)
and ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
P (ω) dω =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
max {0, ζ − Sz (ω)} dω = P.
(15)
Note that the power allocation policy given in (14) and (15)
is also known as “water-filling” (in the spectral domain) [8].
On the other hand, the distribution of a zero-mean stationary
colored Gaussian process is fully determined by its power
spectrum (essentially second moments) [20]. As such, if
σ2
x
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω = P, (16)
and
σ2
z
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sz (ω) dω = N, (17)
then it holds for this pair that
L (px, N) = L (Sx (ω) , N)
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
Sx (ω)
N (ω)
dω
≤
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
Sx (ω)
Sz (ω)
dω
≤
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
P (ω)
Sz (ω)
dω
= C (P, Sz (ω)) = C (P, pz) , (18)
where N (ω) and P (ω) are given by (12) and (14), respec-
tively. In fact, it may be further verified that
L (Sx (ω) , N) = C (P, Sz (ω)) , (19)
if and only if Sx (ω) (in L (Sx (ω) , N)) and Sz (ω) (in
C (P, Sz (ω))) are constants, that is, {xk} is white (in the
definition of channel leakage) while {zk} is white (in the
definition of channel capacity).
The next corollary follows as a special case of Theorem 2
(particularly, see its proof).
Corollary 1: Consider m parallel (independent) channels
with
y = x+ z, (20)
where x,y, z ∈ Rm, and z is independent of x. In addition,
x is Gaussian with covariance
Σx = diag
(
σ2
x(1), . . . , σ
2
x(m)
)
, (21)
where x (i) , i = 1, . . . ,m, denotes the i-th element of x,
and σ2
x(i) denotes its variance. Suppose that the noise power
constraint is given by
tr (Σz) = E
[
m∑
i=1
z
2 (i)
]
≤ N, (22)
where z (i) denotes the i-th element of z. Then, the channel
leakage is given by
L =
m∑
i=1
1
2
log
[
1 +
σ2
x(i)
Ni
]
, (23)
where
Ni =
ζ
2
[√
1 + ζ
σ2
x(i)
+ 1
] , (24)
with ζ ≥ 0 satisfying
m∑
i=1
Ni =
m∑
i=1
ζ
2
[√
1 + ζ
σ2
x(i)
+ 1
] = N. (25)
The aim that we single out this result is to have a di-
rect comparison between the “fire-extinguishing” policy for
channel leakage and the “reverse water-filling” policy for rate
distortion [8]; on the other hand, we already showed the
difference between the “fire-extinguishing” policy for channel
leakage and the “water-filling” policy for channel capacity in
the discussions after Theorem 2. As such, channel leakage is
seen to be essentially different from rate distortion as well (in
addition to channel capacity).
Particularly, consider a parallel Gaussian source with m
independent Gaussian random variables x1, . . . ,xm. Suppose
that the variances of x1, . . . ,xm are σ
2
1 , . . . , σ
2
m, respectively,
and the distortion measure is
∑m
i=1 (x̂i − xi)
2
. Then, the rate
distortion function is given by
R (D) =
m∑
i=1
1
2
log
σ2i
Di
,
where
Di =
{
ζ, if ζ < σ2i ,
σ2i , if ζ ≥ σ
2
i ,
and ζ satisfies
m∑
i=1
Di = D.
On the other hand,
σ̂2i = σ
2
i −Di =
{
σ2i − ζ, if ζ < σ
2
i ,
0, if ζ ≥ σ2i .
This allocation policy is also known as the “reverse water-
filling” [8].
In parallel, the power constraint might be imposed on the
channel output. In this case, we first present the following
result for the colored Gaussian case.
Theorem 3: Consider a scalar channel of m = 1 and
suppose that the channel input {xk} is stationary colored
Gaussian with power spectrum Sx (ω). Suppose also that {zk}
is independent of {xk}. Then, the channel leakage with output
power constraint E
[
y
2
k
]
≤ Y is given by
L =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
Sx (ω)
N (ω)
dω, (26)
where
N (ω) =
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
] , (27)
and ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
N (ω) dω =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
]dω
= Y −
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω. (28)
Note that Theorem 3 is essentially equivalent to the channel
leakage with noise power constraint
E
[
z
2
k
]
≤ Y −
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω. (29)
Specifically, since {zk} is independent of {xk}, we have
Sy (ω) = Sx+z (ω) = Sx (ω) + Sz (ω), and thus
E
[
z
2
k
]
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
N (ω) dω =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sy−x (ω) dω
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sy (ω) dω −
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω
= E
[
y
2
k
]
−
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω
≤ Y −
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω. (30)
IV. FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS OF PRIVACY LEAKAGE FOR
STREAMING DATA
In this section, we present the fundamental lower bounds
on the information leakage rate of streaming data.
Specifically, consider the scenario in which a privacy mask
is to be added to a given data stream, resulting in a masked
data stream that an eavesdropper may have access to. The
information-theoretic privacy leakage (on average) would then
be defined as the mutual information rate between the original
data stream (as a stochastic process) and the masked data
stream (as another stochastic process), that is, how much
information can be extracted from the latter about the former
on average. Accordingly, we may ask two questions. The first
question is: Given a certain power constraint (on the privacy
mask or on the masked data stream), what would be the least
possible average privacy leakage in the long run, and how
to design the privacy mask to achieve this lower bound? Or
equivalently (in a dual manner): Given a certain requirement
on the privacy level in terms of average privacy leakage, what
would be the least possible average power needed on the
privacy mask or on the masked data, and how to design the
privacy mask to achieve this bound? We shall address these
questions one by one.
We first consider the case of noise power constraint.
Theorem 4: Consider a data stream {xk} ,xk ∈ R. Suppose
that {xk} is stationary colored Gaussian with power spectrum
Sx (ω). For the sake of privacy, a noise {nk} ,nk ∈ R is to
be added to {xk} as its privacy mask, resulting in a masked
streaming data {xk} ,xk = xk+nk, whereas the properties of
{nk} can be designed subject to a power constraint E
[
n
2
k
]
≤
N . Then, in order to minimize the information leakage rate
I∞ (x;x) , (31)
the noise {nk} should be chosen as a stationary Gaussian
process that is independent of {xk}. In addition, the power
spectrum of {nk} should be chosen as
N (ω) =
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
] , (32)
where ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
N (ω) dω =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
]dω = N,
(33)
and the minimum information leakage rate is given by
inf
E[n2k]≤N
I∞ (x;x) = L (Sx (ω) , N)
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
Sx (ω)
N (ω)
dω. (34)
Proof: We first prove that {nk} should be independent
of {xk}. Particularly, note that
I (x0,...,k;x0,...,k) = h (x0,...,k)− h (x0,...,k|x0,...,k)
= h (x0,...,k)− h (x0,...,k + n0,...,k|x0,...,k)
= h (x0,...,k)− h (n0,...,k|x0,...,k)
≥ h (x0,...,k)− h (n0,...,k) ,
and
I (x0,...,k;x0,...,k) = h (x0,...,k)− h (n0,...,k)
if and only if {nk} is independent of {xk}. The rest of the
proof proceeds as in the that of Theorem 2, by viewing nk
and xk as zk and yk therein, respectively. That is to say, {nk}
should be stationary Gaussian with power spectrum (32) in
addition to being independent of {xk}, while the minimum
information leakage rate is given by (34).
Note the lower bound is essentially given by the channel
leakage of the virtual channel
xk = xk + nk. (35)
A key link is that the noise is independent of the channel input.
Note also that
I∞ (x;x) = h∞ (x)− h∞ (x|x) , (36)
and hence
h∞ (x|x) = h∞ (x)− I∞ (x;x)
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
2pieSx (ω)dω − I∞ (x;x) . (37)
Since Sx (ω) is pre-given, minimizing I∞ (x;x) is in fact
equivalent to maximizing h∞ (x|x), which is another privacy
measure that is oftentimes employed in estimation problems
(see, e.g., [8], [21]). Particularly,
inf
E[n2k]≤N
h∞ (x|x) =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
2pieSx (ω)dω
−
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
Sx (ω)
N (ω)
dω
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
2pie
Sx (ω)N (ω)
Sx (ω) +N (ω)
dω,
(38)
where N (ω) is given by (32).
On the other hand, a dual problem to that of Theorem 4
would be: Given a certain privacy level, what is the least power
of the noise to be added? The following corollary answers this
question.
Corollary 2: Consider a data stream {xk} ,xk ∈ R. Suppose
that {xk} is stationary colored Gaussian with power spectrum
Sx (ω). For the sake of privacy, a noise {nk} ,nk ∈ R is to
be added to {xk} as its privacy mask, resulting in a masked
streaming data {xk} ,xk = xk + nk, whereas the properties
of {nk} can be designed. Then, in order to make sure that the
information leakage is upper bounded by a constant R > 0 as
I∞ (x;x) ≤ R, (39)
the least power of the noise {nk} to be added is given by
inf
I∞(x;x)≤R
E
[
n
2
k
]
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
]dω, (40)
where ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√√√√1 + Sx (ω)ζ
2
[
1+
√
1+ ζ
Sx(ω)
] dω
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√√√√1 + 2
ζ
[
1 +
√
1 +
ζ
Sx (ω)
]
Sx (ω)dω = R.
(41)
Consider next the case of output power constraint.
Theorem 5: Consider a data stream {xk} ,xk ∈ R. Suppose
that {xk} is stationary colored Gaussian with power spectrum
Sx (ω). For the sake of privacy, a noise {nk} ,nk ∈ R is to
be added to {xk} as its privacy mask, resulting in a masked
streaming data {xk} ,xk = xk + nk, whereas the properties
of {nk} can be designed subject to a power constraint on xk
as E
[
x
2
k
]
≤ X . Then, in order to minimize the information
leakage rate
I∞ (x;x) , (42)
the noise {nk} should be chosen as a stationary Gaussian
process that is independent of {xk}. In addition, the power
spectrum of {nk} should be chosen as
N (ω) =
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
] , (43)
where ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
N (ω) dω =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
]dω
= X −
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω, (44)
and the minimum information leakage rate is given by
inf
E[x2k]≤X
I∞ (x;x) = L
(
Sx (ω) , X −
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω
)
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√
1 +
Sx (ω)
N (ω)
dω. (45)
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 4, it can be proved
that {nk} should be independent of {xk}. In other words,
I (x0,...,k;x0,...,k) ≥ h (x0,...,k)− h (n0,...,k) ,
and equality holds if and only if {nk} is independent of {xk}.
Accordingly, the power constraint reduces to that
E
[
n
2
k
]
≤ X −
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω.
Then, Theorem 5 follows by invoking Theorem 4.
We may again consider the following dual problem.
Corollary 3: Consider a data stream {xk} ,xk ∈ R. Suppose
that {xk} is stationary colored Gaussian with power spectrum
Sx (ω). For the sake of privacy, a noise {nk} ,nk ∈ R is to
be added to {xk} as its privacy mask, resulting in a masked
streaming data {xk} ,xk = xk + nk, whereas the properties
of {nk} can be designed. Then, in order to make sure that the
information leakage is upper bounded by a constant R > 0 as
I∞ (x;x) ≤ R. (46)
Then, the least power of the masked data {xk} is given by
inf
I∞(x;x)≤R
E
[
x
2
k
]
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
ζ
2
[
1 +
√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
]dω
+
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Sx (ω) dω, (47)
where ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
log
√√√√1 + 2
ζ
[
1 +
√
1 +
ζ
Sx (ω)
]
Sx (ω)dω = R.
(48)
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formally introduced the notion of
channel leakage as the minimum mutual information rate
between the channel input and channel output, which char-
acterizes the (least) information leakage rate to the malicious
receiver. We have obtained explicit formulas of channel leak-
age for the white Gaussian case and colored Gaussian case.
We have also investigated the implications of channel leakage
in characterizing the fundamental limits of privacy leakage for
streaming data. Potential future research directions include the
investigation of non-Gaussian cases.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Since {xk} is white, we have
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k) = h (x0,...,k)− h (x0,...,k|y0,...,k)
=
k∑
i=0
h (xi)− h (z0,...,k|y0,...,k)
=
k∑
i=0
h (xi)−
k∑
i=0
h (zi|y0,...,k, z0,...,i−1)
≥
k∑
i=0
h (xi)−
k∑
i=0
h (zi|yi) =
k∑
i=0
h (xi)−
k∑
i=0
h (xi|yi)
=
k∑
i=0
I (xi;yi) ,
and
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k) =
k∑
i=0
I (xi;yi)
if {zk} is white. On the other hand, since xi and zi are
independent, we have
I (xi;yi) = h (yi)− h (yi|xi) = h (yi)− h (zi|xi)
= h (yi)− h (zi) ,
and
I (zi;yi) = h (yi)− h (yi|zi) = h (yi)− h (xi|zi)
= h (yi)− h (xi) .
Then, according to the entropy power inequality [8], we have
22h(yi) ≥ 22h(zi) + 22h(xi),
and hence
22[h(zi)−h(yi)] + 22[h(xi)−h(yi)] ≤ 1.
Consequently,
I (xi;yi) = h (yi)− h (zi) ≥ −
1
2
log
{
1− 22[h(xi)−h(yi)]
}
= −
1
2
log
[
1− 2−2I(zi;yi)
]
.
On the other hand, it can be verified [8] that I (zi;yi) reaches
its maximum
1
2
log
(
1 +
N
σ2
x
)
when zi is Gaussian and E
[
z
2
i
]
= N . Note also that if zi is
Gaussian, then
22h(yi) = 22h(zi) + 22h(xi),
and thus
I (xi;yi) = −
1
2
log
[
1− 2−2I(zi;yi)
]
.
That is to say, I (xi;yi) reaches its minimum if zi is Gaussian
and E
[
z
2
i
]
= N , and the minimum is given by
min
E[z2i ]≤P
I (xi;yi) = −
1
2
log
[
1− 2
− log
(
1+ N
σ2
x
)]
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2
x
N
)
.
As such, as k → ∞, {xk}, {zk}, and {yk} are stationary
white (cf. the proof of Theorem 2), and
min
E[z2i ]≤P
I (xi;yi) , ∀i ∈ N
= inf
E[z2k]≤P
lim
k→∞
∑k
i=0 I (xi;yi)
k + 1
= inf
E[z2k]≤P
lim sup
k→∞
∑k
i=0 I (xi;yi)
k + 1
= inf
E[z2k]≤P
lim sup
k→∞
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
= inf
E[z2k]≤P
I∞ (x;y) = L.
In other words,
L =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2
x
P
)
,
which is achieved when {zi} is stationary white Gaussian with
variance E
[
z
2
i
]
= N .
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We first consider the case of a finite number of parallel
(dependent) channels with
y = x+ z,
where x,y, z ∈ Rm, and z is independent of x. In addition, x
is Gaussian with covarianceΣx, and the noise power constraint
is given by
tr (Σz) = E
[
m∑
i=1
z
2 (i)
]
≤ N.
where z (i) denotes the i-th element of z. (Note that the case
of parallel independent channels, as discussed in Corollary 1,
is a special case of that of dependent channels for when Σx
is diagonal.) In addition, since x and z are independent, we
have
I (x;y) = h (y)− h (y|x) = h (y) − h (z|x)
= h (y)− h (z) ,
and
Σy = Σz+x = Σz +Σx.
On the other hand, the minimum of I (x;y) is achieved if
z is Gaussian (see Section 11.9 of [17]), whereas when z is
Gaussian, we have
I (x;y) = h (y) − h (z)
=
1
2
log [(2pie)
m
detΣy]−
1
2
log [(2pie)
m
detΣz]
=
1
2
log
detΣy
detΣz
=
1
2
log
det (Σz +Σx)
detΣz
=
1
2
log
det
(
Σz + UxΛxU
T
x
)
detΣz
=
1
2
log
det
(
Σz + Λx
)
detΣz
,
where UxΛxU
T
x
is the eigen-decomposition of Σx with
Λx = diag (λ1, . . . , λm) ,
while Σz = U
T
x
ΣzUx. (Note that for a diagonal Σx, we have
λi = σ
2
x(i), where x (i) denotes the i-th element of x, and
σ2
x(i) denotes its variance.) Hence,
tr
(
Σz
)
= tr
(
UT
x
ΣzUx
)
= tr
(
UxU
T
x
Σz
)
= tr (Σz) = E
[
m∑
i=1
z
2 (i)
]
≤ N.
It is known (see Lemma 3.2 of [19]) that
1
2
log
det
(
Σz + Λx
)
detΣz
≥
1
2
log
m∏
i=1
[
σ2
z(i) + λi
σ2
z(i)
]
,
where σ2
z(i), i = 1, . . . ,m, are the diagonal terms of Σz, and
the equality holds if Σz is diagonal, whereas when Σz is
diagonal, we denote
Σz = diag
(
σ2
z(1), . . . , σ
2
z(m)
)
= diag (N1, . . . , Nm)
for simplicity. Then, the problem reduces to that of choosing
N1, . . . , Nm to minimize
1
2
log
m∏
i=1
(
Ni + λi
Ni
)
=
m∑
i=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
λi
Ni
)
subject to the constraint that
m∑
i=1
Ni = tr
(
Σz
)
= N.
Define the Lagrange function by
m∑
i=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
λi
Ni
)
+ η
(
m∑
i=1
Ni −N
)
,
and differentiate it with respect to Ni, then we have
log e
2
(
1
Ni + λi
−
1
Ni
)
+ η = 0,
or equivalently,
Ni =
√
λ2i + ζλi − λi
2
=
ζ
2
(√
1 + ζ
λi
+ 1
) ,
where ζ = 2 log e/η ≥ 0 satisfies
m∑
i=1
Ni =
m∑
i=1
ζ
2
(√
1 + ζ
λi
+ 1
) = N.
Consider now a scalar (dynamic) channel
yk = xk + zk,
where xk,yk, zk ∈ R, and {zk} is independent of {xk}.
In addition, {xk} is stationary colored Gaussian with power
spectrum Sx (ω), and the noise power constraint is given by
E
[
z
2
k
]
≤ N . We may then consider a block of consecutive
uses from time 0 to k of this channel as k + 1 channels in
parallel with dependent noise [8]. Particularly, let the eigen-
decomposition of Σx0,...,k be given by
Σx0,...,k = Ux0,...,kΛx0,...,kU
T
x0,...,k
,
where
Λx0,...,k = diag (λ0, . . . , λk) .
Then, we have
min
pz0,...,k :
∑
k
i=0 z
2
k
≤(k+1)N
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
=
1
k + 1
k∑
i=0
1
2
log
(
1 +
λi
Ni
)
,
where
Ni =
ζ
2
(√
1 + ζ
λi
+ 1
) , i = 0, . . . , k.
Herein, ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
1
k + 1
k∑
i=0
Ni =
1
k + 1
k∑
i=0
ζ
2
(√
1 + ζ
λi
+ 1
) = N.
In addition, as k → ∞, the processes {xk}, {zk}, and {yk}
are stationary, and
lim
k→∞
min
pz0,...,k :
∑
k
i=0
∑
m
i=1 z
2(j)≤(k+1)P
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
= inf
pz
lim
k→∞
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
= inf
pz
lim sup
k→∞
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
= inf
pz
I∞ (x;y) = L.
On the other hand, since the processes are stationary, the
covariance matrices are Toeplitz [22], and their eigenvalues
approach their limits as k → ∞. Moreover, the densities of
eigenvalues on the real line tend to the power spectra of the
processes [23]. Accordingly,
L = lim
k→∞
min
pz0,...,k :
∑
k
i=0
∑
m
i=1 z
2(j)≤(k+1)P
I (x0,...,k;y0,...,k)
k + 1
= lim
k→∞
1
k + 1
k∑
i=0
1
2
log
(
1 +
λi
Ni
)
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
1
2
log
[
1 +
Sx (ω)
N (ω)
]
dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
log
√
1 +
Sx (ω)
N (ω)
dω,
where
N (ω) =
ζ
2
[√
1 + ζ
Sx(ω)
+ 1
] ,
and ζ ≥ 0 satisfies
lim
k→∞
1
k + 1
k∑
i=0
Ni =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
N (ω) dω = N.
This concludes the proof.
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